Introduction
Two of the most prominent debates in the philosophy of science literaturenamely the scientific realism debate and the conventionalism debateoriginate in the work of Henri Poincaré. 1 However, Poincaré is often attributed seemingly conflicting positions when it comes to his stance towards scientific theories and geometry. While Poincaré's conventionalism is often generalised, equating his position to instrumentalism, he is also regarded as developing a form of selective scientific realism, namely structural realism. What is the scope of Poincaré's conventionalism and how does it relate to his structuralism and his general philosophy of science?
This article addresses the above question by analysing Poincaré's arguments for conventionalism, structuralism and his epistemology of science in order to show how these theses fit together. I examine the arguments offered by Poincaré that are usually taken to establish geometric conventionalism: (1) the argument for the underdetermination of geometry by experience; (2) the argument for the intertranslatability of different geometries; and (3) the argument for the constitutive but conventional status of geometry in physics. I show how these arguments relate and establish conventionalism as an epistemological thesis concerned with the status of geometry. Furthermore, I present Poincaré's argument for the conventionality of Newton's laws of motion and show how it differs from the arguments for the conventional status of geometry. I discuss Poincaré's arguments against instrumentalism and his defence of continuity and progress in science, taken to motivate structuralism. I present Poincaré's "layered" approach to scientific theories, according to which empirical science is made possible by synthetic a priori, conventional and empirical elements, and explore how it relates to his structuralism. I conclude that Poincaré's structuralism is deeply entrenched into his neo-Kantianism and conventionalism, and his views are much more complex than contemporary forms of selective realism often attributed to him.
Theory change, continuity and structuralism
One of the central questions Poincaré addresses in his work regards the aim of science: do scientific theories function merely as predictive devices to be abandoned in light of more empirically adequate ones? Or do they aim at providing true descriptions of the unobservable world? This question took central stage at the turn of the 20th century and was widely debated amongst the scientific community. Poincaré played a central role in this debate by arguing that one can defend the continuity of science and scientific progress in light of the apparent discontinuities in theory change.
In Science and Hypothesis Poincaré articulates what the aim of science should be:
The aim of science is not things in themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations between things; outside those relations there is no reality knowable. (Poincaré 2001, xxiv) The object of mathematical theories is not to reveal to us the real nature of things; that would be an unreasonable claim. Their only object is to coordinate the physical laws with which physical experiments make us acquainted, the enunciation of which, without the aid of mathematics, would be unable to effect. (Poincaré, 2001, 117) Despite appearing to defend instrumentalism, Poincaré strongly opposes the instrumentalism of his contemporaries Abel Rey and Édouard Le Roy because he believes that it cannot explain how theories manage to retain some of their content in theory change and also how theories get unified into a single framework. 2 In his chapter 'Is Science Artificial' from The Value of Science, Poincaré responds to Le Roy's instrumentalism, which takes scientific theories to be 'practical recipes' for prediction. He argues that if science has value because of its ability to make successful predictions, then this value must be due to the fact that theories are more than just practical recipes (Poincaré, 2001, 320) . Scientific theories, Poincaré argues, are "a classification, a manner of bringing together facts which appearances separate, though they were bound together by some natural and hidden kinship. Science, in other words, is a system of relations. Now we have just said, it is in the relations alone that objectivity must be sought" (Poincaré, 2001, 347) .
Poincaré's main concern is to account for the so-called 'bankruptcy of science'. 3 He argues that
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science. (Poincaré, 2001, 122) Poincaré is not convinced that this argument from theory change, if it is properly understood, shows that there is no progress in science. Poincaré continues his argument in defence of continuity in theory change by examining the famous transition from Fresnel's ether theory of light to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light. The point Poincaré makes is that Fresnel's equations are entailed by Maxwell's theory, which shows that Fresnel correctly identified some relations between optical phenomena, despite the fact that the nature of light is differently understood. Poincaré argues that while the referent of 'light' has changed from Fresnel to Maxwell, both theories have identified the same relations in the optical phenomena expressed in the equations of these theories. Since the equations survived the theory change, this gives confidence that Fresnel's theory had identified the correct relations despite the change in ontology between the two theories. Poincaré argues that:
The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain, and the sole condition is that the same relations shall exist between these objects as between the images we are forced to put in their place. If the relations are known to us, what does it matter if we think it convenient to replace one image by another? (Poincaré, 2001, 122-123) Poincaré argues that science cannot teach us the nature of 'things' but it can teach us the true relations among them. The evidence for this claim comes from the history of science where one appreciates that despite the constant ontological revisions, the relations that scientific theories reveal remain stable throughout theory change; "there is in [theories] something which usually survives. If one of them has taught us a true relation, this relation is definitely acquired, and it will be found again under a new disguise in the other theories which will successively come to reign in place of the old" Poincaré, 2001, 347-349). 4 Worrall ( 1996) takes Poincaré's argument to be a middle ground between instrumentalism and scientific realism, which he calls structural realism. 5 By committing to the relational content of the theory, while remaining agnostic as to its ontology, Poincaré accommodates both the argument from theory change and the argument from the success of science. Poincaré maintains that there are no radical discontinuities at the level of mathematical structure. The discontinuities that occur in the history of science concern the 'nature' of theoretical entities, not the structure of the theory. This focus on 'structure' and not 'nature' allows the structural realist to argue that science is cumulative; in theory change there are elements of the old theory that are retained in the new one. In the transition from Fresnel's theory to Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, the equations of the former theory are completely preserved in the latter theory. These equations carry different interpretations: in Fresnel's theory light is a 2 Poincaré is often regarded as an instrumentalist or 'global conventionalist', a position called at his time 'nominalism'. Poincaré's contemporary Pierre Duhem is also often classified as an instrumentalist. However Duhem (1954) also argues against the instrumentalism of Rey and Le Roy and articulates two arguments in defence of a moderate position, arguing that instrumentalism cannot explain how scientific theories make novel predictions and get unified into a single 'natural classification'. See Worrall (1996) and Ivanova (2010).
3 Laudan (1981) develops this argument into a meta-induction on the history of science to argue that we cannot be confident in believing that our currently successful theories are true since such confidence in past successful theories was misguided. For Laudan, the history of science allows us to infer that theories that are currently regarded as approximately true and whose terms we regard as referring are actually false, and their theoretical terms fail to refer. 4 Note that despite opposing the acceptance of unobservable entities in his work, Poincaré changed his mind regarding the status of atomism after Perrin's experiments. In his (1913) paper, Poincaré argues for the acceptance of atoms due to there being decisive empirical evidence. Stump (1989) argues that Poincaré is flexible with regard to his realism and does not adopt an all-or-nothing instrumentalism. Krisp (1986) argues that Poincaré's shift was not from instrumentalism to scientific realism, instead, the shift was in Poincaré regarding the atomic hypothesis from a purely metaphysical, or 'indifferent', to an empirical one. Ivanova (2013), further argues that, apart from acknowledging the change of status of the atomic hypothesis, Poincaré's aim in his paper was to raise the problem of whether science gives us reasons to believe in a fundamental level. 5 Giedymin (1982) and Gower (2000) also classify Poincaré as a structural realist.
